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REAL PROPERTY SUBLESSORS ESCAPE CERCLA
OWNER LIABILITY IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
By Alison Sh/om*

I. INTRODUCTION
nde r federa l law, a tenant who subleases a pro perty to a
sublessee w ho con tamin ates the site may be li able fo r
cleanup costs depe ndin g on whi ch federal court hears
the case. 1 The Comprehensive Enviro nm ental Response, Co mpensatio n, and Liability Act's (CERCLA) circ ul ar defin iti o n of a
property "owner" has res ulted in a circuit spli t on thi s issue. 2 ln
the Second Circuit, courts rely on a fi ve-factor test to determine
owner li a bility. 3 In sharp contrast, th e N inth C ircuit in corporates state-specific law to ass ign owner liabili ty.4
The Second C ircuit recently dec ided Next Millennium, LLC
v. Adchem Corp., 5 w here Pufa hl Realty, w hi ch changed its name
to NSR Corp. and ass igned a ll of its assets to NS R Company
(NSR), leased a buildin g located at 89 Frost Street, No rth
Hempstead, New York.6 NSR subleased the property from 1973
to 1976 without the landl o rd 's consent or notice. 7 The subl essee, L inco ln , install ed a commercial dry cleaner that used large
a moun ts of perchl oroethy le ne (PCE) in its da il y operatio ns,
w hi ch res ulted in ground water co ntaminati on and required onsite remediation.8 Twenty years later, between 1997 and 1998 ,
Next M ill e nnium and l 0 I Frost (Next M ill ennium) purc hased
the conta min ated pro perty, confi dent that they co uld recover
upco min g cleanup ex pe nses fro m the prev ious s ublesso r and
subl essee as li abl e parties .9
Nex t Mi ll ennium claimed that NSR was a de fa cto ow ner
at the tim e of conta min atio n under a si te contro l th eory of
ownershi p. 10 The Court of A ppea ls rej ected a ll c lai ms, referring to the precedent set in Commander Oil v. Bario Equipment
Corporation, 11 the contro lI ing ownership test at th e time of the
dec ision. 12 ln Com mander Oil, the Second Circ uit establi shed
a fi ve-fac tor test to determin e ownership . 13 Th e fi ve fa cto rs
are: ( I) th e length of the lease and ri ghts of the owner/lessor to
determine use of the prope1ty ; (2) the term s of the lease all ow ing
the owners to termin ate the lease befo re it expires; (3) the ri g ht
of the lessee to sublet the pro perty without notify ing the own er;
(4) the lessee's responsibility to pay taxes, assess ments, in surance, and operatio n and maintenance costs; and (5) the lessee 's
responsibili ty to make repairs. 14 The court fo und that NSR was
not an owner under the Commander Oil test, and L inco ln , the
origin al tenant corporation, had di sso lved by the tim e of sui t. 15
Therefore, the subl essor and subl essee escaped contributio n and
j o int and severa l liability. 16
Next M ill ennium fil ed a petiti on fo r certiorari with th e
Supre me Co urt, chall eng in g th e Commander Oil fi ve-fac to r
test. 17 The petiti oners argued that a sub lessor sho uld be liabl e
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fo r costs of cleaning up contamination when the sublessor satisfi es the sta te-spec ifi c common law definiti o n of "owne r," had
exc lu sive site co ntro l, and po lluted the site th ro ugh its operati ons.1 8 The Supreme Court deni ed certiorari. 19
The Commander Oil test diverges fro m use of state-specific
co mm o n law in ass ig nin g ow ne r li a bility und er CER CLA,
yet it remain s the law in th e Seco nd C irc uit. 2 0 Consequ ently,
a subseque nt buyer such as Next M illennium- whi ch had no
s ite contro l at th e time of the po llu ting event, di d not s ubl ease
the property to po lluting subl essees, and did not profi t fro m the
contaminati o n- potenti a ll y bea rs th e burden of pay in g for all
cleanup costs wi thout contributi o n fro m other parties.21
This co mm e nt argues that th e Second C irc uit 's divergence
fro m th e state-spec ifi c commo n law rega rdin g owner li abil ity
unde r CER CLA is inco ns istent w ith Congress's clear inte nt,
unlike the N inth C irc uit's approac h, because it does no t in corporate state-spec ifi c comm on law and it separates "owne r" fro m
"operato r. " Part lI describes Congress 's intent for CE RCLA li abili ty.22 Part ll also expl ain s the creati o n of the Second C irc uit 's
owners hi p test, the Ninth Circuit's state-spec ific comm o n law
approac h to owne rship , and the co mmo n law in New Yo rk and
Cali fo rni a, respecti ve ly, regarding ow nership .23 Part III arg ues
th at th e Seco nd C ircuit owners hi p test is in co nsiste nt w ith
Congress's intent for stri ct owner li abili ty by dev iating fro m th e
state commo n law defi niti on of"owner," while the N inth C irc uit
approach provides a clear g uide lin e, using state commo n law to
ass ign owne r li abi lity und er CE RCLA.24 Part JV recommends
th at the Supreme Co urt or Congress overturn th e Second Circuit
ownership test because it is inconsiste nt w ith th e remedi al purposes of CER CLA .25 T hi s comme nt concludes that the Second
C ircuit ow ners hip test deters in vestors fro m purchas ing contaminated land due to th e likelihood of liti gati o n on th e indi c ia
of ownership. 26

II. BACKGROUND
Hazardo us waste sites pose a se ri ous threat to the e nvironment a nd hum an hea lth.27 ln 1980, pri or to a n admini strati ve
change, Cong ress acknow ledged the significance of these harm s
and enacted CERCLA. 28

*Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2019, America n Uni versity Wa shington Co ll ege
of Law; B.A. Environmenta l Stud ies, Un iversity of Co lorado at Boulde r. A spec ial thank yo u to my fa ntastic edi tors for the ir time and ded ication ass isting on
th is pi ece, Professor Amanda Leiter and Professor Barry Breen for the ir wisdom
and gu idance, and my fa mi ly for thei r support.

15

A.CERCLA
1.

BACKGROUND AND CONGRESSIONAL f N TENT

Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to facilitate prompt
cleanup of hazardous waste sites and place the financial burden of environmental contamination on those responsible and
benefitting from the externalized cost of the waste. 29 Congress
enacted CERCLA to impose liability for clean-up of land and
water retroactively, lay out a process for identifying priority
sites, and determine the appropriate response actions. 30
Under CERCLA, the government is authorized to respond
to a release of a hazardous substance and then recover cleanup
costs from potentially liable parties. 31 Congress intended that
courts hold liable those who are responsible for the contamination so long as the interpretation is supported expressly by the
statute or by the legislative history. 32
CERCLA lacked clarity, and in 1986, Congress clarified
CERCLA with the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA). 33 Ten years later, in 1996, Congress made a
second attempt at clarification with the Asset Conservation ,
Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act (ACA). 34
However, neither set of amendments clarified the basic meaning
of the word "owner." 35
For three decades , plaintiffs persuaded the courts that
CERCLA's remedial purpose mandates a liberal interpretation
and broad application of the statute. 36 However, in CTS Corp. v.
Waldburger,37 the Supreme Court explicitly urged lower courts
to honor the statutory text. 38 It is still unclear, however, whether
lower courts are ready to accept Waldburger as the proverbial
nail in CERCLA's broad remedial purpose 's coffin.

2.

LIABLE P ARTIES U NDER S ECTION

107

CERCLA liability under Section 107 extends to four classes
of potentially liable parties (PRPs).39 These classes include current owners and operators of a property, certain past owners and
operators, arrangers of disposal of hazardous waste, and transporters of hazardous waste.4 Congress rejected a general causation formula that would assign liability for contamination based
on a party 's connection to the site. 41 This distinction holds owners and operators liable for contaminated facilities and facilities
that show a threat of contamination regardless of whether the
owner or operator caused the contamination. 42
The statutory language is circular and vaguely defines
an owner and operator as "any person owning or operating"
contaminated property. 43 The circular definition of owner and
operator gave courts the discretion to assign meaning to the
statutory language and therefore govern CERCLA liability.44
Congress intended that courts decide the circumstances under
which a holder of a less-than-fee-simple interest in real property
is subject to owner liability, but the definition remains indeterminate and creates confusion in the enforcement of the statute. 45
Ownership of land under CERCLA is a property issue, and
property law questions are traditionally a matter of state law.46
The Supreme Court established that state courts determine property interests based on their own rules .47 The Supreme Court

°
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clarified in United States v. Bestfoods 48 that when Congress gave
the word "operator" a circular definition , the definition should
be based on the plain meaning of the word and state common
law. 49 The Second Circuit interpreted Bestfoods to distinguish
"owner" and "operator," while the Ninth Circuit interpreted
Bestfoods as direction to follow the state common law definition
of "owner. " 50

3.

JOINT AND SE VERAL LIABILITY U NDER CERCLA

CERCLA is a strict liability statute and imposes liability
on some parties who may not have acted culpably. 51 By the
time Congress enacted CERCLA, courts had established that in
pollution cases where two or more defendants cause indivisible
harm , the defendant could seek contribution from their joint
tortfeasors. 52 Harm at a CERCLA site is usually indivisible,53
and therefore courts hold defendants jointly and severally liable
under CERCLA.54
Congress deleted CERCLA's original joint and several
liability section, saying that the standard should be the same as
the Clean Water Act Section 31 I .55 However, Courts have determined that Congress intended that courts incorporate joint and
several liability principles in judicial interpretation. 56 Congress
envisioned that doctrines of federal common law govern liability issues of federal government interest that are not resolved
expressly in CERCLA. 57
The Second Restatement of Torts makes joint and several
liability the presumption .58 When the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) immediately cleans up a CERCLA site, courts
assign joint and several liability to the liable parties.59 On the
other hand , when the harm is less immediate, a private party
may clean up the CERCLA site, and courts assign either joint
and several or several liability to parties who are liable. 60

4.

THE RIGHT TO S EEK CONTRIBUTION U NDER SECTION

113(F)

Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 with SARA to permit
private persons to sue to recover at least some of their cleanup
costs from other PRPs under Section l B(f). 61 This amendment
created a separate federal cause of action and eased the burden
of the original defendant sued by the EPA. 62 A defendant who is
found liable under Section 107 is entitled to relief under Section
113(f) by seeking contribution from other PRPs if the defendant can demonstrate divisibility of the environmental harm .6 3
The court may allocate costs as it determines appropriate.64 In
Cooper Industries, In c. v. Aviall Services, In c. 65 and United
States v. Atlantic Research Corp ,66 the Supreme Court held that
a private party who has not been sued under CERCLA 106 or
107(a) may not obtain contribution under 113(f)(l) from other
liable parties. 67 These cases modified the extent of contribution rights and limited the ability of private parties to recover
response costs. 68

5.

THE BONA FIDE PROSPECTI VE P URCHASER D EFENSE TO

CERCLA LIABILITY

Investors that conduct Environmental Site Assessments
may be exempt from CERCLA liability under the " bona fide
prospective purchaser" (BFPP) exemption. 69 The application
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of th e BF PP pro vision became cl earl y enforceable for tenants under the Brownfi elds Utili zation , Investme nt, and Local
Development Act of 201 8. 70 A tenant whose lease of a property
began after January 11 , 2002 can establi sh a BFPP defe nse to
CERCLA owne r liability, and the reby escape liability w hen
leas ing previously-contaminated property. 7 1

B . CI RCUIT S PLI T

IN AP PROACHING O WNER L IA BILITY

UNDER CERCL A

The circ ul a r defi niti on of a prop erty "owner" und er
CERCLA has res ulted in a circuit split. 72 In the Second Circuit,
courts depend on a fi ve-fac tor test to determine owner liability. 73
The N inth Circuit, on the other hand, incorporates state-specifi c
law to ass ign owner li ability.74

1.

T HE S ECOND CIRCUIT O WNERSHIP T EST

Unde r New York common law, tenants (and not landlords)
are held respons ibl e for injury caused by the condition of use
of leased property. 75 To interpret state environmental statutes,
New York courts fo llow the principle that tort liability concerning pro perty depend s on occupation and control. 76 H owever, the
Second C ircuit fra mewo rk fo r CERCLA owner liability does not
fo ll ow thi s principl e. 77
ln Commander Oil, the Second C irc uit ge ne rated a new
five -fac tor factor test to determine de fac to ownership ofa lessee
under CERCLA .78 Comm ander Oil owned a lot that Bario subleased to Pas ley.79 The subl eased lot housed petroleum storage
tanks, and Pas ley used the lot to repackage so lvents purchased in
bulk and to reclaim and revitalize used so lvents.80 The EPA di scovered contamination and remedi ated the site, and Commander
Oil agreed to reimburse th e EPA fo r costs.8 1 Commander Oil
sought contributi on unde r CERCLA fro m Bari o a nd Pas ley as
potentiall y li abl e parti es. 82 The court fo und that Bario did not
possess suffic ient " attributes of ownership" beca use all facto rs
showed that Bario did not have the rights and obligati ons of an
owner.83
Th e Second C ircuit 's definiti on of " owner" is not determin ed by state law. 84 In Bestfoods , the Suprem e Court diffe renti ated "owner" from "operator." 85 As th e Supreme Court
c larified, Congress intended th at the court use plain meaning
of the word "operator" and state common law as bedrock principl es.86 The Second C ircuit interpreted Bestfoods to defin e
" ow ner" and "operator" as di sjuncti ve. 87 Disjunctive definiti ons
lead to a limited interpretati on of liability and the Second Circuit
fra mework incenti vizes litigation. 88

2. T HE NINTH CIRCUIT COMMON L AW O WNERSHIP T EST
By contrast, the N inth C ircuit fo ll ows the Supreme Court's
guida nce in Bestfoods and uses state common law to determine
owner li ability und er CERCLA .89 Ca li fo rnia common law
di stingui shes between possessory interests, such as revocable
permits and ownershi p interests. 90
The N inth C irc uit used state common law when examining
whether an easement constitutes ownership for CER CLA li ability in Long Beach Unified School District v. Dorothy B. Goodwin
California Living Trus t.9 1 The easement holders (M&P) ran
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a non-polluting pipelin e across a parce l of land .92 The loca l
school di strict sued th e tenant who m aintained a waste pit tha t
contaminated the land, and the tenant settled.93 T he loca l schoo l
di stri ct also sued M&P under CERCLA for co ntributi o n, even
though the pipelin e had no connecti on to the waste pit. 94 T he
cou rt fo und that holding an easement does not itself constitute
" ownership" in relevant civil state p roperty law because an easement is merely a limited ri ght to use pro perty that is possessed
by another entity.95
In City of Los Ang eles v. San Pedro Boat Works ,96 P ac ifi c
A merican, w hose successor-in-inte rest was S CI Coca -Co la,
possessed revocable pe rmits fro m the C ity of Los Ange les fo r
Berth 44 boat works. 97 The C ity found co ntamination on th e s ite
and claimed that BCI Coca-Co la was li a bl e as an owne r under
CERCLA. 98 T he N inth C ircuit he ld that BCI Coca-Co la mere ly
held possessory in terests and therefore was not an owne r. 99 T he
court lim ited owner li ability to those who hold the "sti cks in th e
bundle ofri ghts." 100
In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Un ited States, 10 1 the Di str ict
Court of Arizona recognized that a party holding a fee title could
have less than absolute ownership. 102 However, it also held tha t
a fee title holder with plenary and superv isory powers is lia ble
as an owner under CER CLA. 103 The United States ma intained
power over the reservation land at the time of the contaminati on
and thus was deemed li able under CERCLA as a n owner. 104

III. ANALYSIS
A . THE

S ECOND CI RCU IT DI VERG ED FROM

C ONGRESS IONAL I NTENT BY CREATING A F EDERAL T EST
FOR O WNERS HIP AND S EPARATING " O WNER" FROM
" O PERATOR. "

W hen enacting CERCLA, Cong ress empowered courts to
interpret li ability. 105 However, a court mu st fo ll ow Co ngress 's
intent to develop the co mm on law fo r CERCLA ow nership
liability, place the fin ancial burden of environm e nta l contamin ati on on those responsible and benefi tting fro m the acti vities that
caused the waste, and interpret th e statute broadl y and liberall y
so long as the interpretati on is supported ex press ly in the statute
or thro ugh legislati ve hi story. 106 T he Second C irc uit 's five factor test fo r determining ownership does not fo llow state common law and does not all ow Congress's goa ls for CER CLA to
manifes t. 107 In contrast, the N inth C ircuit uses the state-spec ific
property law definiti on of " ownership ." 108 The Ni nth C irc uit 's
interpretation of CERCLA li ability offers clear guidelin es fo r
investors in land and therefore incentiv izes early settlements, as
intended by Congress. 109

J.

THE SECOND C IR CUIT'S O WN ERSHIP T EST F ACTORS

ARE S USCEPTIBLE TO MA NIPULATION IN LITIGATION W HICH
CREATES A B ARRJER FOR I N VESTMEN T.

The Seco nd C ircuit created a fi ve-factor ownership test to
limit the site contro l ownership test and to separate "ow ner"
from "operator." 11 0 The judge-made test fo r ownership appli es
to both Section l 07 a nd Secti on l I 3(f) of CERCLA, whi c h
all ow the government to recoup fin ancial losses and fo r pri vate
17

p a rti es to split the costs of conta minati o n c leanup among o ther
PRPs. 111 Th e Commander Oil test is an expanded vers io n of the
s ite-control test, w hi ch Seco nd C irc uit courts rej ected fo r being
overbroad . 11 2
Whil e the N inth C irc ui t fo ll ows a state co mm o n law
a pp roac h , as in struc ted by both leg is lat ive hi s tory a nd the
S upre me Court in B estfoods, the Second C irc uit di verged fro m
the sta te co mm o n law defi niti o n of o wne rship when decidin g
Co mmander Oil by c reating thi s fi ve-fac to r ow ne rship test. 11 3
Cong ress's re medi a l goa ls in enacting CER CLA were to fac ilitate prompt c leanup of hazard o us waste s ites and to ho ld parti es
li a ble who we re ultimate ly respons ibl e fo r the contamin ation,
de pe nde nt o n th e facts of the case . 11 4 rn pa rtic ul ar, Cong ress
intend ed th e p rin c ipl es of state commo n law govern li ability
iss ues no t reso lved express ly in CE RCLA beca use co mm on
law prin ciples are traditiona l a nd evo lving . 11 5 Whil e presenting
the fi na l, comp ro mi sed CE R C LA bill , Se na tor R ando lph and
R epresentative F lo rio express ly enco uraged the deve lopment of
commo n law in de termining the liability of j o int to rtfeaso rs who
are resp o nsibl e fo r the costs of cleanup unde r CER CLA , w hi ch
would, in turn , pro mote uni fo rmity of in terpretati o n of the statute .116 The Second C ircuit 's fi ve-factor test exp ands on th e site
contro l test ra the r tha n fo ll ow ing the state-specific defi ni tio n of
" ow ne r," a nd the refore, the Second C irc ui t's method for defi ning
ow ne rs hip und e r CER CLA is inco ns iste nt w ith Congress io nal
inte nt. 11 7
In addi t io n to appl y in g state co mm o n law, Co ng ress
inte nd ed th at CER C L A in centi vize q ui ck c lean-up of co ntamin a ted la nd , w hi c h requires that courts g ran t incenti ves for
investors to buy a nd c lean conta min ated land effic ie ntly, uc h as
a strea mlined path to receive contributi o n fro m other PRP s. 11 8
T he Second C irc uit's fi ve-facto r Commander Oil ownership test
is eas ily m a nipul ated, thereby incentiv iz ing li tigati on. 11 9 Due
to thi s ma nipul ati o n, a party w ho seeks co ntr ibuti on fro m other
PRPs may not be a ble to o btain such contributi o n . 120 Thi s test
goes aga in st th e purpose of CER C LA a nd does not prov ide a
s uffi c ie nt in centive to avo id conta min atio n of la nd. 121 As ev ide nced in Next Millennium , the Second C ircuit ho lds a subseq ue nt purc haser so le ly liabl e based o n a federa l j udge-m ade law
that contradi cts the state pro perty law, w hi c h may have required
co ntributio n fro m the pri o r lessee th at subl et th e faci lity to a
contaminating subl essee. 122
Cong ress e nacted CERC LA to pl ace the fi nancial burden of
e nv ironm e nta l conta m inati o n o n th ose respo nsibl e and benefi ttin g fro m th e activiti es that caused th e waste. 123 As a result of
the Co mmander Oil owners hip test, a subsequent owner in the
Second Circuit w ho had no s ite co ntro l, did not subl ease th e
p ro pe rty to th e po lluting subl essees, a nd did not profit fro m the
conta minati on bears the burde n of providin g a ll clea nup costs. 124
M eanwhile, s ublessors wh o had s ite co ntrol and occupati on of
the fac ili ty a t th e time of conta minati o n escape ow nership li a bil ity because the lease is des ig nated as typica l and does not transfe r ownership to the lessee. 125 The Commander Oil ownership
test does no t fo ll ow the Cong ressio nal inte nt to put the financial
burden of cleanup o n a ll parties wh o are resp onsibl e fo r the land
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contaminati o n. 126 Additi ona ll y, Commander Oil diverges fro m
co ngress iona l inte nt becau se the test re li eves sublesso rs from
owner li a bility despite acting as an owner. 127 The Ninth C ircuit
has di scredited a nd rej ected Commander Oil as imp ro per in
determining ownership liability under CERCLA, demo nstrating
the Second C irc uit 's di vergence fro m the intended comm on law
appli cati on of owner liabili ty. 128
Rath er th an definin g "ow ne r" und e r CER CLA as dete rmined by sta te law, the Seco nd C ircuit 's federal judge- made
law me re ly ex pa nd ed the s ite-contro l test. 129 Und e r New
Yo rk Co mm o n Law, tena nts a nd hot la ndl o rds are ge nera lly held resp onsibl e fo r injury caused by leased pro perty. 130
Additiona lly, New Yo rk courts fo ll ow the principle that li abili ty
in tort concerning property genera ll y depends o n occupation and
contro l. 131 ln Commander Oil, the Seco nd C ircuit dec lined to
fo ll ow the settled prin cipl es of ew York co mmon law, whi ch
pro vide an easy sta ndard to meet " own ership" and th e refore
is a more expans ive a pproac h and holds mo re PRPs li ab le for
clea nup costs. 132 The Second C ircuit's approac h to ownership
li abili ty has more fac to rs to consider, whi ch resul ts in a na rrower
fra mework fo r owner liabili ty under CERCLA. 133
In additi o n to its inconsistency with Congress iona l intent to
fo ll ow state common law, the Second Circuit's interpretati on of
CERCLA li abili ty in Commander Oil limi ts the reach of owner
li a bili ty by defi ning " owner" as separate fro m "operato r." 134 In
determinin g w hether Bari o was an "owne r" and therefore li able
fo r contribu tion, the Second C irc ui t's Commander Oil ownership test rejected the comm on law site contro l test fo r ownership
li abil ity, reasoning that thi s definiti on of "ow ner" is too simil ar
to "operator." 135 T he Second Ci rcuit looked to Bestfoods, and
interpreted the Supre me Court's dec isio n to mean th at courts
sho uld di stin g ui sh "owner" and "op erator. " 136 In Commander
Oil, the court reasoned that contro l over a fac ility could establi sh
operation, so if site contro l co uld also esta bli h ownership, then
operatio n woul d be merely a subset of ownership . 137 H owever,
the rul e of dec ision fo r the term "operator" in Bestfoods is analogous to th e term " owner" because Congress gave both terms circul ar defi niti o ns in CERCLA . 138 Therefore, the Second C ircuit
did not fo llow the Supreme Court's precedent and rely on tate
common law to defi ne "owner" when the statute prov ides a circul ar definition of the term . 139 The Second C irc uit's ownership
test does not support the ew York commo n law princ iple in
determining ownership under CERCLA and is inconsiste nt w ith
legislative hi story. 140
F urth erm ore, th e Seco nd C ircuit mi s inte rprets Secti ons
I 07(a)( l) and (2) of CERCLA by separating owner and o perator
li ability. 141 Congress ass ig ns li a bility to ow ners, operato rs, or
both under CERC LA. 142 Secti o ns 107(a)( I) and (2) ofCE RCLA
use "and" and "or" interchan geabl y. 143 Owner and operator substanti ally overl ap in th e language of the statute; thus courts are
in structed by the language to interpret them overlappin g rather
tha n as a lternatives. 144 If Cong ress intended owners and operators to be separate and not overl apping, they would al ways use
" o r" or would w rite " the ow ne r and the operator" rath e r than
" th e owner and o perator." 145
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2.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S CONSTR UCTION OF O WNER

LIABtl!TY H ows LIABLE B oTH THE P ASSIVE TITLE O wNER
OF R EAL PROPERTY WHO A CQUIESCES IN A NOTHER

's

CONTAMINA TION AND THE A CTIVE O PERATOR OF THE
F AC/llTY.

Cong ress intended for courts to de ve lo p a state co mmon
law definiti on of " owner." 146 The N inth C ircuit ap pli es the
co mmo n law definition of "owner" to de te rmin e whethe r to
ass ign liability under CERCLA Sections I 07 and I 13(f). 14 7 The
N inth C ircuit, but not the Second Circuit, has uni formly appli ed
CE RCLA owner li ability as intended by Cong ress by deve loping
the state common law definition of"owner." 148
The N inth Circuit has followed legislati ve inte nt by incorporating the state-specific definition of " owner" from relevant
property law cases . 149 The inth Circuit focuses o n case law
rather than the imm edi ate a nd unique facts of each case, a nd
questions the role of " indi c ia of ownership." 150 The N inth
C ircu it courts continue to deve lop a consistent comm on law definition of "owner" to determine owner liab ili ty under CERCLA
by relying on principles such as expansions and adaptati o ns of
the site control test to determine ownership . 15 1
T he in th Circu it has developed the comm on law distinction of whether an easement ho lder is an owner, thereby honoring Congressiona l intent to apply the state-specific definition
of "owner." 152 The N inth C ircuit 's potential " bundle of rights"
exce pti on to th e common law di st in cti on between possesso ry
and owne rship rights di ffers from the Commander Oil test
because the bundle of rights exception limits li abi lity to those
who enj oy the rights of ownership, whi le the Co mmander Oil
test is an expanded vers ion of the s ite control test. 153
The N inth C ircui t's framework for assigning owner li ab ili ty
has deve loped by incorporating state comm on law, as Congress
intended. 154 In Long Beach, the inth Circ ui t looked to both
federal and Ca li fo rni a common law to determine the definition
of "owner" in regards to CERCLA liability. 155 The court noted
that c ircular defi nitions within a statute show Congress io na l
inte nt for co urts to apply "ordinary mea nin gs" rather than
unu sua l or technical alternative meanings. 156 The com mo n
law clearly states that there is a distinction between holding an
easement and owning the contaminated land . 157 Therefore, the
court appli ed this defi nition and found th at mere ly holding an
easement is not suffi cient to constitute "ownership" for purposes
of CERCLA li ability. 158 In San Pedro , w hi c h a lso took place
in Ca li fo rni a, the court continued to build upon the Ca li fo rni a
common law, inc luding the holding from Long Beach, and further di stin gui shed between ownership interests and possessory
interests. 159 In San Pedro , the court fo und that site contro l was
not enough, and built upon the site control test w ith state common law regarding a fee titl e owner 's control over a permittee 's
use of the property. 160
Unlike the Second C ircuit, the inth C ircuit fo ll ows state
common law and thus imposes liability on ly on parties responsib le under state law providing clear g uide Iin es fo r investors
in land . 16 1 In enacti ng CER CLA , Congress intended to place
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the financ ia l burde n of contamin ation on those w ho were actua ll y responsible, based on the fo ur categories under CER CLA
Section I 04 rather than by causatio n. 162 In El Paso Natural
Gas, the N inth C ircuit recognized that a party holding the fee
title co uld have less than abso lute ownership, but that a fee
title holder w ith pl enary and supervisory powers constitutes an
owner that is liable under CERCLA, and therefore the court held
the superv isor of the fac ili ty liable for the contamination. 163 The
defendants, w ho he ld fee title and substantial powers over the
land , co ntributed to the costs of cleanup. 164 This interpretat io n
of CER CLA li ability under Sections 107 and I I 3(f) s uppo rts
the statute's remedi a l purpose of holding liable those who were
ultimate ly respons ibl e and who may have be nefi tted from the
externa li zed cost of contamination, or w ho were otherw ise co nnected with the contaminated site. 165
The N inth C ircuit has taken an ap proach that foc uses o n
appl ying state common law and fulfillin g the remedial purposes
of the CERCLA stat ute. 166 By fo ll ow ing the state com m on law
definition of "owner," a sub lessor in the N inth Circui t who has
site contro l and otherwise acts as an owner of the fac ili ty is
likely to be liabl e as an owner under CERCLA fo r the remedial
costs of conta min ation by thei r subl essees. 167

B.

TH E S u BLEssoR IN NEXT MI LLE

B EE

ruM Wo LD HAVE

H ELD LIABLE IF THE S ECO D CIRCUIT USED THE

NINTH CIRCU IT FRAM EWORK FOR CERLCA O WN ER
LI AB ILI TY.

In D epartment of Tox ic Substances Control v. Hearthside
Residential Corp ., 168 the inth Circu it defined current owner
a nd operator status under CERCLA at the time c lea nup costs are
incurred rather when a recovery lawsuit seeking re imbursem e nt
is fi Jed. 169 Subsequent purchasers who incur the cost of c leanup,
therefore, are co ns id e red current owners of a property. 170
Fo ll owing this precedent, ext Millennium was held li ab le as
the current owner in Next Millennium rather than the orig in al
po lluter. 17 1 However, Next Millennium could have so ug ht contribution from the prev ious owners under Section l l3(f). 172
The Second C ircuit tried Next Millennium a nd , as a result,
the subseq ue nt purchaser of the property- w ho had no s ite
contro l at the time of the contamination, did not subl ease the
property, and did not profit from the contamin atio n- bore the
burden of provi ding a ll cleanup costs. 173 Next M ill e nnium
sought contr ibuti o n from the su blessors for cleanup costs of the
contamin ation to 89 Frost Street under CERCLA Sections l 07
a nd l I 3(t). 174 The Second Circuit did not have the authority to
overrul e the Commander Oil test, and as a result, the tenants ,
w ho sub let the property to a contami nating subtenant, escaped
owners hip li abili ty. 175
When Congress enacted CER CLA, it intended the statute
to fac ilitate prompt cleanup of hazardo us waste sites and pl ace
the financial burden of env ironmenta l contamin ation on those
responsible for and benefitting from the activities that ca used
the waste. 176 Furth ermore, Congress intended that courts cons ider leg islati ve hi story wh il e interpreting the plain language
of the statute. 177 If the Second C ircuit ruled cons istently with
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congress ional intent and applied New York's common law in
N ext Millennium, the sublessor may have been held liable as an
owner. 178
The Second Circuit misinterpreted the statutory language of
CERCLA Sections 107(a)(l) and 107(a)(2) in Next Millennium
by defining "owner" and "operator" as completely separate
terms. 179 The court would not have di stinguished between
owner and operator if it had fo llowed Congress 's intent and the
language of the statute because the statute uses "owners and
operato rs" and "owners or operators" interchangeably. 180 By
using these terms interchangeably, Congress intended that the
terms overlap. 181
T he Next Millennium s ubl essor wo uld have like ly passed
the common law test fo r ownership because the sub lessor leased
to the sublessee without notice or consent of the landowner. 182
San Pedro Boat Works shows that the "bu ndle of rights" exception in the Ni nth C ircuit covers this type of control over land . 183
Under New York comm on law, courts generally look to occupation and contro l of the site. 184 The subl essor in Next Millennium
exercised co ntro l over the faci lity at 89 Frost Street at the time
that the sub lessee contaminated the faci lity, and therefore the
Second C ircuit would have likely hel d the sublessor li ab le if it
applied ew York common law to assess the sub lessor's ownership status. 185 This is unlike 3550 Stevens Creek Associates v.
Barclays Bank, 186 where the inth Circuit did not extend owner
li abi lity to past and present ow ners of commerc ial buildings
containing asbestos. 187 However, contaminati on of PCE is commonly tried in CERCLA cases and is at the heart ofCERCLA. 188
The limitation in 3550 Ste vens Creek Associates wou ld likely
not app ly to N ext Millennium because there was more relevant
common law regarding PCE co ntam ination than there was common law for commercia l buildings conta ining asbestos. 189 The
Second Circuit did not fo ll ow a state common law approach and
instead followed the Commander Oil five-factor test, which is
judge-made law. 190 Despite there being no auth ority that limits ownership to one party, the Second C ircuit 's interpretation
focused on whether the sub lessor was either an operator or an
owner.1 91
It is likely that the inth Circuit would distinguish Next
Millennium from other N inth Circuit cases that find easement
holders are not held li ab le as owners under CERCLA. 192 Jn San
Pedro Boat Works , Pacific American, whose successor-i n-interest was BCI Coca-Co la, possessed revocable permits from the
City of Los Angeles for ten months for Berth 44 boat works and,
after the city investigated the site, found that it was contam inated .193 The c ity claimed that BCI Coca-Co la was liab le as an
owner under CERCLA during the contamination. 194 The court
followed Long Beach and looked to the common law definition
of "owner," including California common law which said that
there is a distinction between holding an easement and ownin g
the contaminated land. 195 T he court distinguished between owners hip interests and possessory interests and held that because
Pacific American was a ho lder of mere possessory interests,
BCI Coca-Cola was not an owner and therefore not held li ab le
as an owner. 196 San P edro Boat Works and Long Beach would
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be distinguished from Next Millennium because common law
differs from New York to Ca li fo rnia, and New York common
law regardin g property typically ho ld s tenants liabl e for tort
caused by actions on a property. 197 Un like in San Pedro Boat
Works and Long Beach, the defendants in Next Millennium held
ownership interests because they subleased the property without
notice or consent from the landlord and were, therefore, owners
in effect. 198 The Ninth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit interpretation of owner liabili ty, further showing the contrast of the
likely outcome ifthe Second Circu it tried Next Millennium using
the inth Circuit's reasoning. 199 The Second Circuit, using the
same approach as the Ninth Circu it, should have applied New
York common law standard when deciding Next Millennium by
using an occupation and site contro l test. 200
The inth Circuit wo uld have likely held the sub lessor
li ab le as an owner under CERCLA because Congress intended
that the courts would broadly and liberally app ly CERCLA liability.201 Setting precedent that holds a sub lessor liabl e would
be considered a libera l interpretation of the statute. 202 The
inth Circuit wou ld have prioritized liberal interpretation of the
statute because it fo llows the Congressiona l intent for CERCLA
li ab ility.203 This finding wo uld be simil ar to El Paso Natural
Gas because the defendants were found li ab le as owners despite
having granted significant property interests to another party.204
In both cases, the defendants held substantial powers over the
property. 205 However, the Second C ircuit's Commander Oil test
narrowly interprets CERCLA liabi lity.206
The Ninth Circuit's approach does not focus on the unique
facts of a case, unlike the Second Circuit. 207 Therefore, the
inth Circu it's approach to CERCLA owner liabi lity in Next
Millennium would have foc used on the relevant com mon law
regarding subleases rather than the Commander Oil five-factor
test. 208 This finding wou ld have turned out differently if tried in
the inth Circu it; if a court looks to the common law rather than
to the unique facts of the case, then the five-factors may not be
addressed in considering whether the subl essor is an "owner." 209
ln ew York, com mon law for liabi lity in tort generally depends
on occupation and contro l. 210 The sublessor in Next Millennium
had control over the property, and therefore, the Ninth Circuit
would have likely fo und that the subl essor was an owner under
CERCLA Sections l 04 and l I 3(f) to contribute to cleanup costs
of the contami nation. 211
The court wou ld have likely placed the financial burden
on the sublessor because the sublessor was ultimately responsib le fo r the contamination .212 Congress intended to hold those
responsible for contamination li ab le to pay for the cleanup. 213
The Ninth Circu it 's interpretation of CERCLA liability focuses
on the remedial aspect of the statute .214 The sublessor in Next
Millennium wou ld ultimately be responsible for the contamination because it sub leased the fac ility to contaminating sublessees
without the consent or notice of the landlord and had full control
over the facility.215 Additiona ll y, the sublessor profited substantially from the sub lease, which is a significant indicator that it
would bear the financial burden of cleanup if the Second Ci rcuit
had followed the Ni nth C ircuit 's correct interpretation of the
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statute. 2 16 The ori ginal purpose behind CERCLA was to ho ld
parties liabl e fo r contamination w ho are ultimate ly responsibl e
fo r the contaminati on, and so looking to who had control of th e
site at the time of the contaminati o n is an accepta bl e mea ns of
determining who is li abl e as an owner under CERCLA. 2 17
The N inth C irc uit also wo uld have like ly he ld the subl essors li able as owners, so th at th e landow ner co uld rece ive
contributi o n because the N inth C irc uit has p revio us ly provi ded
an in centi ve fo r pri vate parti es to pay fo r c leanup or to sett le
with the confi dence that they can be recuperated by o ther potenti a ll y li able parti es. 2 18 The Seco nd Circ uit 's ho lding in Next
Millennium sets a precedent fo r fu ture pote ntially li abl e parties
to refuse to remediate a si te and encourages liti gation o n the
Commander Oil five-fac tor test rather than settle me nt. 2 19 T he
N inth Circ uit know ingly rej ected the Commander Oil five-facto r
test and therefore avoided th ese legislative issues fo r a statute
that is already heav il y liti gated.220

IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
The di sposal of hazardo us waste endangers publi c hea lth
and the e nviro nm ent. 221 T he Uni ted States has many co ntaminated sites, and Congress enacted CE RC LA to qui ckly a nd
effecti ve ly cl ean these sites by enco uragin g pri vate parties to
vo luntarily clean up contam inated sites.222 T he Supreme Cou rt
of the Uni ted States decli ned the oppo rtunity to correct the
Second C ircuit 's Commander Oil test by denying certiorari in
Next Millennium .223 As a res ult, confus ion remain s as to w hat
land in vestors can expect when buyi ng contaminated property in
the Second Circui t. 224
The Commander Oil facto r test prov ides a n un pred icta bl e o utcome w hi ch incenti vizes liti gati o n rath er tha n ea rl y
settlement, and thi s is aga inst CE RCLA's re med ial purpose.225
In vestors are mo re like ly to buy land if they can be confid e nt
that oth er PRPs will share the fi nancial burden of c leanup .226
l f litigati o n is required to ensure contributi o n of oth er PRPs,
investors are less like ly to in vest, and the contaminated sites w ill
re main contaminated. 227 The Second C ircuit 's Commander Oil
test to determine owner liability is fl ex ibl e and nebul ous, creating an unpredictable barrier fo r in vestors and therefore investors
are less likely to invest in contaminated land .228
T he N inth C irc uit adhered to th e interpretati o n of ow ner
as fo und in Ca li fo rni a comm o n law, w hi c h prov ides c lear

ex pectations for investo rs of land .229 Unli ke the Second C irc ui t,
the N inth C irc ui t reac hed a prop er interp retati o n of CER CLA
ownership li abili ty by pl acing those li abl e who were responsibl e
fo r the conta mination, because it fo ll ows state common law a nd
thus provides clear guide lines fo r investors in land.230
T he Second Ci rc ui t has stated that it does not have the
authority to overturn the Commander Oil ownership test itse lf, so
th e Supreme Court o r Congress must overturn the Commander
Oil ownership test. 23 1 Congress qui ckly drafted the la ng uage
of CE RCLA, and Co ng ress could fi x its mistake by ame ndin g
the statute to set a clear path fo r establi shing CERCLA li a bility
aga in st a tenant of a fac ility.232 A n easy so lu tio n that wo uld
still a ll ow states to incorporate state-spec ific defi ni tions of commo n law wo uld be to add "and/or" when di scussing " owner
and o perator" and "owner or operato r. " 233 This solution wo ul d
c larify Cong ress's intent to extend li ability and would invali date
the Seco nd C ircuit 's current approac h. 234 A lternati ve ly, the
S upre me Co urt should overturn th e five -facto r test in favor of
a defi niti on of "owner" based on state-spec ific property law.235

V. CONCLUSION
Despite a di vergence fro m use of state-spec ific com mon law
in ass ig ning owner li ability under CER CLA , Commander Oil
re mains the law in the Second Circu it. 236 Conseq uently, a subseq uent buyer who has no site contro l at the ti me of the po llu tin g
eve nt, does not sublease the property to po lluti ng sub lessees ,
and does not profit fro m the conta min ation may bear the burde n
of pro vidi ng a ll clea nu p costs a nd may not rece ive contri bution fro m othe r potentia ll y li ab le pa rties if bring ing the ir case
in the Seco nd C irc ui t. 237 O n the othe r hand, th e N inth C irc ui t,
w hi c h fo ll ows a clear state definiti on of"owner" that can pred ict
wheth er PR.Ps will settle, fulfill s Congress 's intent and continu es
to incentivize private cleanup of contami nated s ites. 238
After Next Millennium , it is like ly that lawyers in the Second
C ircui t will advise the ir clients to beware of pu rc hasin g co nta min ated land due to the likeliness of liti gati o n on the indi c ia
of ownership .239 As a result, contaminated sites in the Second
C irc uit on the Nationa l Priorities L ist w ill remain stagna nt, and
conta mination will continue to damage the environment a nd c reate furth er risks fo r publi c health .240
!Ji

ENDNOTES
See Petition fo r Writ of Certi orari at 3-4, Nex t M il lenni um Rea lty, LLC v.
Adchem Corp ., 138 S. Ct. 5 10 (20 17) o. 17-468) (arguing that the Second
C ircui t's interpretati on o f ownership liability does not accompl ish the remed ia l
goa ls of the statute to ho ld those responsible that created the conta mination).
2
See 42 U.S .C. § 960 I (20 12) (de fi ning "owner or operator" as any person
own ing or operating) ; see generally Petition fo r Writ o f Certiora ri , supra note
3
See Petition for Wri t of Certiorari , supra note I, at 7- 8, (castin g doubt on
the five-factor test for ownershi p).
4
See City of Los A nge les v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3 d 440, 448 (9th
C ir. 20 11 ) (l ooki ng to Ca lifo rn ia property law) ; see also Nex t M ill enn ium
Rea lty, LLC v. Adch em Corp ., o. C Y 03-5 985(G RB ), 20 16 WL 11 78957
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(E .D . . Y. Mar. 23 , 20 16), ajf'd sub nom. ex t M ill enn ium Rea lty, LLC v.
Adchem Corp., 690 F. App ' x 7 10 (2d Cir. 20 17), cerl. denied, 138 S. C t. 5 10
(2 0 17) (describin g a c ircuit di vergence in interpretati on of th e defin ition of
"owner" regardi ng CE RC LA liabil ity for sublessors).
5
690 F. App ' x 7 10 (2d C ir. 201 7), cert. denied, 138 S. C l. 5 10 (20 17) .
Id. at 7 12.
See Next Millennium Realty, LLC, 20 16 WL I 1789 57 at *2 (fail ing to
address the lack o f notice or consent by th e landl ord in fi ndin g the sublessor no t
li abl e as an owne r).
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